Some news items gave me a nagging itch.
One, some segments of the "Occupy Movement" declared for Ron Paul, exposing the anti-government at all costs attitude that lies beneath much populist fuzzy thinking. They proudly quote the mad "Network" rant, "we're mad as hell and we're not gonna take it any more!".
A second article quoted some Hispanic leaders as warning that their voters were angry about the deportation policy of the the administration.
Another item noted that emails which had been exposed which fueled doubts about man made global warming were not put out by deniers, but rather by activists on the well meaning left who feared that third world economic progress would be stalled by climate change policies.
Remember Ralph Nader.
"I'm not a member of any organized political party. I'm a Democrat." Will Rogers
That accurately describe a problem for liberals in any political season and now poses obstacles for our candidate, the now and (hopefully) future president.
No one can be elected by hewing to strict ideologically pure liberal (or progressive, if you prefer) rhetoric or programs. Even FDR, who is seen by the right as the epitome of a dangerously liberal president, wasn't deemed radical enough for many on the left of his own party.
The Democratic Leadership Council was formed by the right wing of the party to correct the perceived failure of tired left ideas that led to losses by McGovern, Dukakis, and Mondale. Clinton and Gore rescued the so-called Reagan Democrats by triangulating, co-opting conservative talking points: welfare reform, balanced budgets, free trade, tough on crime, pro death penalty, strong defense.
Obama has done as well as he could with the tools at his disposal and given the obstacles thrown in his path. Like FDR, he had to salvage a corrupt capitalist system from itself. As in the 1930's rapid and complete recovery of the economy is not within his power to achieve.
His problem is that as a scruples moderate, he is dealing from a tepid ideology that doesn't fit with our angry and polarized public's notion of the "passion" they want, either from the left or right.
His solution may be that his opposition quotes Pogo: "We have met the enemy and he is us." Walt Kelly (Pogo).
Showing posts with label Bill Clinton. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bill Clinton. Show all posts
Monday, January 02, 2012
Sunday, January 23, 2011
"Slick Barack"?
In the always shifting high stakes political hold em game, President Obama seems to be making some clever bets. On the other side of the table the playas seem confused.
That's enough of stale deadens metaphors, whew.
It is interesting. Obama's poll numbers are up. The schizo electorate spanked him in November and he surprised by "getting things done" during the lame duck session. What he got done was to take hold of The Center while Republicans as a result of their win, lost the center and were pushed further toward the untenable extreme Right. Hahaha.
We oldies have seen this before. 1994. Clinton takes a licking after his and Hillary's health care crash. Newt becomes the Speaker of the House. He steers shapely Right. "the Contract With America" gave Clinton the opening to move to the Center, reduce deficits, fight crime, boost entrepreneurism (later known as "the dotcom bubble"). Newt sputtered as the economy improved and Slick Willy got re-elected.
It may be Deja vu all over again.
That's enough of stale deadens metaphors, whew.
It is interesting. Obama's poll numbers are up. The schizo electorate spanked him in November and he surprised by "getting things done" during the lame duck session. What he got done was to take hold of The Center while Republicans as a result of their win, lost the center and were pushed further toward the untenable extreme Right. Hahaha.
We oldies have seen this before. 1994. Clinton takes a licking after his and Hillary's health care crash. Newt becomes the Speaker of the House. He steers shapely Right. "the Contract With America" gave Clinton the opening to move to the Center, reduce deficits, fight crime, boost entrepreneurism (later known as "the dotcom bubble"). Newt sputtered as the economy improved and Slick Willy got re-elected.
It may be Deja vu all over again.
Sunday, June 13, 2010
Feel No Pain
Bijou would come home from a frustrating day at work
and want to talk about it
... and talk about it.
I would come home from a frustrating day at work
and want to forget it.
So she talked
... and I listened.
Then I made a terrible mistake.
I suggested solutions for her problems.
She became enraged.
"Don't solve my problem.
Just listen to me and empathize."
I protested.
I am a lawyer,
trained to hear my clients' problems
and to solve them.
Imagine if I told my client that I empathized,
and then left the jail.
Eventually I learned to speak the language,
to sense the warning signs
that marked the beginning of the burst of emotion
that demanded attention.
Bill Clinton is credited
with mastering personal politics.
He made everyone,
especially female voters
feel as if he understood
and empathized
with their problems.
In the jargon of the time,
he felt their pain.
Barack Obama has a hard time with Clintonspeak.
His approach is more lawyerly,
less emotive.
In a crisis he will first seek facts,
then seek solutions.
The press and shallow observers slam him
for failing to show emotion
(i.e., anger) at enemies of the state
-- like BP and GM.
The media wants him to be more like an action star
swearing revenge.
Would they prefer the G.W. Bush tactic
of manipulating the overwrought emotions
of the nation following 9/11
to lead us into disastrous wars?
and want to talk about it
... and talk about it.
I would come home from a frustrating day at work
and want to forget it.
So she talked
... and I listened.
Then I made a terrible mistake.
I suggested solutions for her problems.
She became enraged.
"Don't solve my problem.
Just listen to me and empathize."
I protested.
I am a lawyer,
trained to hear my clients' problems
and to solve them.
Imagine if I told my client that I empathized,
and then left the jail.
Eventually I learned to speak the language,
to sense the warning signs
that marked the beginning of the burst of emotion
that demanded attention.
Bill Clinton is credited
with mastering personal politics.
He made everyone,
especially female voters
feel as if he understood
and empathized
with their problems.
In the jargon of the time,
he felt their pain.
Barack Obama has a hard time with Clintonspeak.
His approach is more lawyerly,
less emotive.
In a crisis he will first seek facts,
then seek solutions.
The press and shallow observers slam him
for failing to show emotion
(i.e., anger) at enemies of the state
-- like BP and GM.
The media wants him to be more like an action star
swearing revenge.
Would they prefer the G.W. Bush tactic
of manipulating the overwrought emotions
of the nation following 9/11
to lead us into disastrous wars?
Saturday, February 20, 2010
Principled Centrist Revisited
Last year I published a post based on an essay I originally wrote in the 1990's. I updated it to apply the ideas stated to Obama. I tried to fit him into the traditional mold of the "principled centrist," a tradition which included the best presidents in our history: notably Washington, Lincoln, F.D.R. It also encompassed some failures.
Bill Clinton's presidency showed how difficult it is for a centrist to govern in this era. With the pervasive sniping of 24/7 media critics, ideological and cultural polarization that approaches the sectional suspicions preceding the Civil War, and the absence of public consensus about any particular crisis, the ability of even the most charismatic president to lead is doubtful.
I am re-printing the essay again because it seems that its points are still pertinent to the political climate today.
Like many of my peers in the late 1960's, I entered a law career with a radicalized illusion that I could shake up The Establishment from within. But early in my career as a public defender, I became persuaded that idealists made lousy lawyers.
Viewing a case as "a cause" led to ineffective advocacy for the individuals who were our clients. Railing against "the system" was a losing strategy; tweaking it to make it work led to some success. To work from within demanded adherence to core principles - like those expressed in the Bill of Rights, but also a rational sense of moderation. Seeing the flaws of radical ideologies of Left and Right, I came to think of myself as a principled centrist.
The flaw of this philosophy is that it can easily lead to indecision, timidity, and a loss of confidence. Weak compromises are tempting when the risks are great. Uncertainty leads to failure and depression.
Barack Obama, by education and inclination, is a principled centrist. His legal education, which suited his innate propensities, prepared him well for effective advocacy. The first attribute of the lawyerly approach is the ability to see all sides of a question. The second is the exercise of judgments based on reason and evidence rather than faith and ideology.
The term itself is an oxymoron in presidential politics. The centrist is wedded to no firm ideology that huge numbers of people can identify with. It is historically rare to satisfy enough of the people enough of the time from the middle of the road.The centrist is not an ideologue, except to moderation. Idealogues have a rigid vision, a religious faith in their righteousness. Moderation and consensus are lukewarm ideals. Neither notion stirs passion.
Ronald Reagan’s simple ideology allowed him to be certain and clear about every issue: lower taxes, secure defense, less government, American domination of foreign affairs, strict Christian morality and adherence to normative lifestyles.
A centrist cannot be sure about any of these things, is sometimes for some of them, against some at some other times. He is a relativist - his motto must be "It depends." His survival depends on compromise.
A principled centrist in American politics is, by definition, in trouble. First, he states his principles, then is forced to compromise them.
Bill Clinton’s adventure with the health care issue in the 1990's is a cautionary tale. He stated a principle: universal coverage. Eventually, he had to temporize, and was seen as weak, the inevitable risk of centrists. The result: his leadership coinage dissipated. He could not fall back on the moral leverage of ideology, had no constant constituency on left or right.
At first, it seemed that Obama had advantages Clinton never had. Times had changed. In 1993, Clinton’s "mandate for change" was tenuous at best. G.H.W. Bush had alienated a chunk of the Reagan coalition - the middle right - with higher taxes and a weak economy. Because Clinton was a "new" Democrat, based on a sensible, more conservative model, who shied from liberal doctrine, he was positioned as non-threatening. On the left, he was pictured as youthful, a JFK disciple, compassionate, with a feminist wife - a guy of the sixties, who had matured to moderate progressivism. Many "boomers" could identify with that beause they had moved that way as well.The two-faced picture was enough to gain him a slim plurality in a three way race. Perot's candidacy made it clear that the only consensus in the public mind was that government was distrusted, and that the majority of voters were slightly to the right of center.
But that is where the consensus ended. There was no singleness of mind in the public for where it wanted a president to go. There was no mandate for any particular change.
Clinton thought it was there for health care reform, fooled by the fact that he spoke about it in his speeches and he was elected. But the public was never fully committed to it, and was easily swayed by fears of expense and bureaucratic incompetence.
In this as in every other issue the people wanted reform, but didn’t want to pay for it: crime, the economy, services, campaign reform. The public was schizophrenic: apathetic and impatient at the same time.
When the Republicans reclaimed the Congress in 1994 with a severe ideological conservative agenda, it forced Clinton the centrist to waffle to the right. The lesson was clear: a centrist may only succeed as a progressive leader if the public is ready to be led and only then by a leader who is perceived as a hero without baggage.
The commentators of the time blamed Clinton for a lack of leadership. The great leader defines the issues and unifies the people behind him. That Clinton failed to do.
What he was forced to do is what a centrist does best: react to the extremes of left and right. He must be the captain of a sailing ship, tacking left and right but steering the middle. Clinton’s political acumen was such that he was able to survive well enough to be re-elected and, despite his tragic personal flaws, his presidency is now remembered as a time of peace and prosperity.
At the beginning of his term, Obama’s seemed to have an advantage: the crises caused by the failure of G.W. Bush’s failure, which is ascribed rightly to the flaw of rigid ideological governance, had forced public opinion to coalesce into a coherent consensus for change - not necessarily "radical" change, but at least, meaningful reform.
The last time that happened was in 1964, when L.B.J. took advantage of his opponent’s extreme conservatism, to form a strong coalition for social change. He succeeded in passing meaningful civil rights reform and programs that began a "war on poverty", only to self-immolate over Viet-Nam.
F.D.R. is probably the better model for Obama. F.D.R. was (and still is) perceived as a decisive leader because his motto was "do anything, but do something." He was able to take chances because the public of the time was willing to be led - almost anywhere. The times were that bad. His one principle was that government had to put people back to work.
Everything he proposed, supported, persuaded, was directed toward that goal. He had many detractors from the left and right, but he had such a convincing presence to a people desperate for charismatic leadership that he prevailed and is revered as a great leader.
Bear in mind that in F.D.R.'s era, "charismatic leadership" in the form of dictatorships were preferred by mainstream political theorists to democracy, which seemed in the period between the World Wars, to have failed. Today, there is an echo of that era --- extreme fear caused by economic collapse and democratic institutions unable to ameliorate the crises --- China seen as a paragon of successful governance ---as many had perceived Italy of the 1920's and Germany of the 1930's.
FDR revived the democratic system because he was able to form a consensus from huge chunks of the public: union members -- in a time of solidly unified, active and powerful unions, Southern poor, the unemployed --- 25% unemployment in the depths of the depression ---and the educated un-rich.
At the start, the Obama constituency seemed to be similarly broad: the educated and hopeful young, aspiring Hispanics and proud African-Americans, depressed boomers. Those who voted for him, adding to his landslide and coattails, were also a significant number who were not committed to any "change" except that which threw the rascals out.
Like F.D.R., Obama benefitted from a bankrupt and disillusioned opposition party. The fatal flaw of ideological and faith based governance is that when exposed as false by incontrovertible evidence it collapses.
The strength of principled centrism is that its flexibility and foundation of moderation and reliance on evidence permit fine-tuning alterations without conceding defeat.
Parenthetically: in the view of many historians, FDR’s policies failed to end the Depression because they were not radical enough. His centrism was a flaw, led to inconsistent contradictory policies. He wavered from his initial policy of governmental activism, caving to budget balancing contraction of spending, overly fearful of the political consequences of huge deficits. He was saved by the war which reinvigorated the broad consensus and commitment to action.
Now, Obama, faced with apparent dissatisfaction by a vocal minority to his policies, has to decide whether to reclaim the centrist ground by accepting compromise, or to retreat to the right by abandoning any progressive agenda, or to try to forge a new coalition on the left to push through an aggressive program.
Obama, the principled centrist, walks the dangerous tightrope, his only net is his legal background, which, I hope, will permit him to find his way through analysis of facts, collection of evidence pro and con, and submitting all potential policies to thorough logic based argument before moving.
Bill Clinton's presidency showed how difficult it is for a centrist to govern in this era. With the pervasive sniping of 24/7 media critics, ideological and cultural polarization that approaches the sectional suspicions preceding the Civil War, and the absence of public consensus about any particular crisis, the ability of even the most charismatic president to lead is doubtful.
I am re-printing the essay again because it seems that its points are still pertinent to the political climate today.
Like many of my peers in the late 1960's, I entered a law career with a radicalized illusion that I could shake up The Establishment from within. But early in my career as a public defender, I became persuaded that idealists made lousy lawyers.
Viewing a case as "a cause" led to ineffective advocacy for the individuals who were our clients. Railing against "the system" was a losing strategy; tweaking it to make it work led to some success. To work from within demanded adherence to core principles - like those expressed in the Bill of Rights, but also a rational sense of moderation. Seeing the flaws of radical ideologies of Left and Right, I came to think of myself as a principled centrist.
The flaw of this philosophy is that it can easily lead to indecision, timidity, and a loss of confidence. Weak compromises are tempting when the risks are great. Uncertainty leads to failure and depression.
Barack Obama, by education and inclination, is a principled centrist. His legal education, which suited his innate propensities, prepared him well for effective advocacy. The first attribute of the lawyerly approach is the ability to see all sides of a question. The second is the exercise of judgments based on reason and evidence rather than faith and ideology.
The term itself is an oxymoron in presidential politics. The centrist is wedded to no firm ideology that huge numbers of people can identify with. It is historically rare to satisfy enough of the people enough of the time from the middle of the road.The centrist is not an ideologue, except to moderation. Idealogues have a rigid vision, a religious faith in their righteousness. Moderation and consensus are lukewarm ideals. Neither notion stirs passion.
Ronald Reagan’s simple ideology allowed him to be certain and clear about every issue: lower taxes, secure defense, less government, American domination of foreign affairs, strict Christian morality and adherence to normative lifestyles.
A centrist cannot be sure about any of these things, is sometimes for some of them, against some at some other times. He is a relativist - his motto must be "It depends." His survival depends on compromise.
A principled centrist in American politics is, by definition, in trouble. First, he states his principles, then is forced to compromise them.
Bill Clinton’s adventure with the health care issue in the 1990's is a cautionary tale. He stated a principle: universal coverage. Eventually, he had to temporize, and was seen as weak, the inevitable risk of centrists. The result: his leadership coinage dissipated. He could not fall back on the moral leverage of ideology, had no constant constituency on left or right.
At first, it seemed that Obama had advantages Clinton never had. Times had changed. In 1993, Clinton’s "mandate for change" was tenuous at best. G.H.W. Bush had alienated a chunk of the Reagan coalition - the middle right - with higher taxes and a weak economy. Because Clinton was a "new" Democrat, based on a sensible, more conservative model, who shied from liberal doctrine, he was positioned as non-threatening. On the left, he was pictured as youthful, a JFK disciple, compassionate, with a feminist wife - a guy of the sixties, who had matured to moderate progressivism. Many "boomers" could identify with that beause they had moved that way as well.The two-faced picture was enough to gain him a slim plurality in a three way race. Perot's candidacy made it clear that the only consensus in the public mind was that government was distrusted, and that the majority of voters were slightly to the right of center.
But that is where the consensus ended. There was no singleness of mind in the public for where it wanted a president to go. There was no mandate for any particular change.
Clinton thought it was there for health care reform, fooled by the fact that he spoke about it in his speeches and he was elected. But the public was never fully committed to it, and was easily swayed by fears of expense and bureaucratic incompetence.
In this as in every other issue the people wanted reform, but didn’t want to pay for it: crime, the economy, services, campaign reform. The public was schizophrenic: apathetic and impatient at the same time.
When the Republicans reclaimed the Congress in 1994 with a severe ideological conservative agenda, it forced Clinton the centrist to waffle to the right. The lesson was clear: a centrist may only succeed as a progressive leader if the public is ready to be led and only then by a leader who is perceived as a hero without baggage.
The commentators of the time blamed Clinton for a lack of leadership. The great leader defines the issues and unifies the people behind him. That Clinton failed to do.
What he was forced to do is what a centrist does best: react to the extremes of left and right. He must be the captain of a sailing ship, tacking left and right but steering the middle. Clinton’s political acumen was such that he was able to survive well enough to be re-elected and, despite his tragic personal flaws, his presidency is now remembered as a time of peace and prosperity.
At the beginning of his term, Obama’s seemed to have an advantage: the crises caused by the failure of G.W. Bush’s failure, which is ascribed rightly to the flaw of rigid ideological governance, had forced public opinion to coalesce into a coherent consensus for change - not necessarily "radical" change, but at least, meaningful reform.
The last time that happened was in 1964, when L.B.J. took advantage of his opponent’s extreme conservatism, to form a strong coalition for social change. He succeeded in passing meaningful civil rights reform and programs that began a "war on poverty", only to self-immolate over Viet-Nam.
F.D.R. is probably the better model for Obama. F.D.R. was (and still is) perceived as a decisive leader because his motto was "do anything, but do something." He was able to take chances because the public of the time was willing to be led - almost anywhere. The times were that bad. His one principle was that government had to put people back to work.
Everything he proposed, supported, persuaded, was directed toward that goal. He had many detractors from the left and right, but he had such a convincing presence to a people desperate for charismatic leadership that he prevailed and is revered as a great leader.
Bear in mind that in F.D.R.'s era, "charismatic leadership" in the form of dictatorships were preferred by mainstream political theorists to democracy, which seemed in the period between the World Wars, to have failed. Today, there is an echo of that era --- extreme fear caused by economic collapse and democratic institutions unable to ameliorate the crises --- China seen as a paragon of successful governance ---as many had perceived Italy of the 1920's and Germany of the 1930's.
FDR revived the democratic system because he was able to form a consensus from huge chunks of the public: union members -- in a time of solidly unified, active and powerful unions, Southern poor, the unemployed --- 25% unemployment in the depths of the depression ---and the educated un-rich.
At the start, the Obama constituency seemed to be similarly broad: the educated and hopeful young, aspiring Hispanics and proud African-Americans, depressed boomers. Those who voted for him, adding to his landslide and coattails, were also a significant number who were not committed to any "change" except that which threw the rascals out.
Like F.D.R., Obama benefitted from a bankrupt and disillusioned opposition party. The fatal flaw of ideological and faith based governance is that when exposed as false by incontrovertible evidence it collapses.
The strength of principled centrism is that its flexibility and foundation of moderation and reliance on evidence permit fine-tuning alterations without conceding defeat.
Parenthetically: in the view of many historians, FDR’s policies failed to end the Depression because they were not radical enough. His centrism was a flaw, led to inconsistent contradictory policies. He wavered from his initial policy of governmental activism, caving to budget balancing contraction of spending, overly fearful of the political consequences of huge deficits. He was saved by the war which reinvigorated the broad consensus and commitment to action.
Now, Obama, faced with apparent dissatisfaction by a vocal minority to his policies, has to decide whether to reclaim the centrist ground by accepting compromise, or to retreat to the right by abandoning any progressive agenda, or to try to forge a new coalition on the left to push through an aggressive program.
Obama, the principled centrist, walks the dangerous tightrope, his only net is his legal background, which, I hope, will permit him to find his way through analysis of facts, collection of evidence pro and con, and submitting all potential policies to thorough logic based argument before moving.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
THE 'SAY IT AIN'T SO' MOMENT
Those who cannot understand why Tiger Woods, a man with so much to lose, would risk it all by committing risky sexual behavior are ignorant of Borenstein’s Law.
But after all, the head scratchers say, Woods is one athlete whose reputation for good character was squeaky clean. His trademark as a golfer is his intelligent approach to the sport. He is the most physically fit and the smartest golfer on the course, whose preparation and discipline are unparalleled.
So what? Bill Clinton was the smartest guy in any room. He was the freakin’ president of the U.S., dude.
Borenstein’s Law holds that decisions and conduct which are against an individual’s best interests and therefore by common sense would seem to be unlikely, are actually within the normal range of human behavior, no matter the stature of the individual in society. This kind of apparently irrational risky behavior accounts for most of the annoying things teens do, most crimes of impulse, and most philandering in the upper crust.
More interesting is that the Woods case seems to illustrate a corollary to Borenstein’s Law: Goodness (i.e., high moral character) and Greatness (i.e., exceptional achievement) are often mutually exclusive, that is to say people of great accomplishments in their chosen field usually would not qualify for sainthood if the standard is morality in their private lives.
The examples proving this point are too numerous to mention, but I will mention one prominent example. Albert Einstein, perhaps the greatest thinker of the 20th Century and one of the greatest of all time, was a self acknowledged failure as husband and father.
He was a selfish man, discarded his first wife (herself a trained physicist whose ideas may have contributed to his early work) and their three children without a second thought after years of surreptitious affairs, including one with his cousin, who became his second wife. He then proceeded to be unfaithful to her as often as the opportunities arose. He admitted his personal failings, attributing them to his nature, and his need for concentration on his work.
One other point worth mentioning. When the subject arises, the conclusion is often criticized as chauvinistic, seen as a weak argument justifying male prerogatives relating to monogamy. I don’t believe the propensity for risky behavior is limited to one sex.
I.e.: Catherine THE GREAT. Q.E.D.
But after all, the head scratchers say, Woods is one athlete whose reputation for good character was squeaky clean. His trademark as a golfer is his intelligent approach to the sport. He is the most physically fit and the smartest golfer on the course, whose preparation and discipline are unparalleled.
So what? Bill Clinton was the smartest guy in any room. He was the freakin’ president of the U.S., dude.
Borenstein’s Law holds that decisions and conduct which are against an individual’s best interests and therefore by common sense would seem to be unlikely, are actually within the normal range of human behavior, no matter the stature of the individual in society. This kind of apparently irrational risky behavior accounts for most of the annoying things teens do, most crimes of impulse, and most philandering in the upper crust.
More interesting is that the Woods case seems to illustrate a corollary to Borenstein’s Law: Goodness (i.e., high moral character) and Greatness (i.e., exceptional achievement) are often mutually exclusive, that is to say people of great accomplishments in their chosen field usually would not qualify for sainthood if the standard is morality in their private lives.
The examples proving this point are too numerous to mention, but I will mention one prominent example. Albert Einstein, perhaps the greatest thinker of the 20th Century and one of the greatest of all time, was a self acknowledged failure as husband and father.
He was a selfish man, discarded his first wife (herself a trained physicist whose ideas may have contributed to his early work) and their three children without a second thought after years of surreptitious affairs, including one with his cousin, who became his second wife. He then proceeded to be unfaithful to her as often as the opportunities arose. He admitted his personal failings, attributing them to his nature, and his need for concentration on his work.
One other point worth mentioning. When the subject arises, the conclusion is often criticized as chauvinistic, seen as a weak argument justifying male prerogatives relating to monogamy. I don’t believe the propensity for risky behavior is limited to one sex.
I.e.: Catherine THE GREAT. Q.E.D.
Sunday, October 18, 2009
One Brief Shining Moment
For one brief shining moment in November of 2008 Americans seemed unified. For the first time in at least a generation, an election produced a meaningful consensus for change.
But it is one of the many curses of long life that I must remember that these shining moments are all too brief and that the shine is easily and quickly tarnished.
The reality is that the default position for the American electorate is stasis; i.e., resistance to real change. The nature of our politics is that elections are decided by a small percentage of voters - so-called swing voters because they have no ideological or party loyalty. Rather, they sway from left to right to middle, easily manipulated by events, rhetoric, rumor, always motivated by fear.
Obama’s brief shining moment, his Golden Age, may be one of the shortest ever. FDR’s lasted about four years (1933 through 1936); LBJ’s two years (1965 and 1966).
If the health care law turns out to be a disappointment, meaning that (1) it fails to provide universal coverage, (2) seems to be a boondoggle to the insurance companies, and (3) is perceived to be too costly for most people, and if unemployment continues to rise or seems to be stagnant, the midterm election of 2010 may bring an end to any possible alteration of the status quo.
I well remember the 1960's, an era which - to this current generation - stands mostly for excessive optimism and bad hair. The notion that spiritual enlightenment was achievable through individual or collective shortcuts such as drugs, meditation, rock and roll, or free love is rightly viewed as a ridiculous illusion.
But that is not the 60's that I best remember. Another side of the optimistic urge for change manifested in more rational but no less hopeful attempts at leaps of progress. The United States Supreme Court, an institution which for most of our history has been a powerful force against even incremental change, for the blink of an eye under Chief Justice Earl Warren, carried the struggle for societal progress, with revolutionary decisions that enforced racial equality, ensured the separation of church and state, and gave new meaning to the Bill of Rights, especially the often neglected minority protections, the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Amendments. It has taken the powers of reaction 40 years to unravel the framework the Warren Court constructed.
In the middle of the decade, political winds gathered to create a perfect storm of progress that had not been equaled since 1933. After the death of JFK, the Republicans nominated Barry Goldwater, the most ideological and polarizing candidate possible. LBJ won a strong mandate and used his unique position as a Southerner with a congressional expertise to pass the Civil Rights Act, the most important racial equality law passed since Reconstruction.
In 1965, LBJ pushed through the Congress the experiment in socialized medicine called Medicare. He followed this with the most optimistic set of programs since the New Deal: his War on Poverty, a constellation of programs designed to directly aid the poor. It included Head Start, the Job Corps, food stamps, and was credited with reducing the percent of families below the poverty line to the lowest it had ever been.
Of course, LBJ soon trashed all the possibilities for progress with his tragic Vietnam policy. Most of his programs were quickly dismantled with the rise of Milton Friedman, resulting in deregulation, reliance on so-called “free markets”, the decline of trade unionism, and “trickle down economics.”
Beginning in the disastrous year of 1968, the Democratic Party began a rapid decline. Progressivism (poisonously labeled “Liberal”) became a dirty word, rejected by the two successful presidential candidates, both right of center Southern governors, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Both tried to meld a few social policies that were mildly progressive with economic policies that co-opted moderate Republican positions. Both abetted the erosion of Constitutional freedoms, supporting laws that expanded the police power of the government. Carter began the rush to deregulation; Clinton raised campaign fundraising to an art, surpassed Republicans in pandering to corporate lobbyists with the resulting policies that declared “the era of big government was over” and abetting a free market boom that laid the groundwork for Bush’s subsequent rape of the middle class and the crash of our entire economy.
The election of 2008 at first presented a mirror image of the 1968 election. This time, it was the Republican candidate who was saddled with the legacy of disaster by his party’s president. The difference was that this Democrat presented a literal face of change in the most obvious sense. Yet, in a sense, this was an illusion. Oddly, Barack Obama resembles JFK in this way. His personal image wreaks of change, but his politics is actually less radical than his image.
Obama’s overwhelming victory, which dragged in Democratic majorities in both houses of congress, was another illusion. The apparent “mandate for change” neglected to consider the realities, particularly of Democratic party politics. Clinton democrats really control the Senate, with “Blue Dogs”, or heirs of the Democratic Leadership Council, whose politics are barely distinguishable from Republicans.
The lack of difference between the parties has been decried by many observers, cited as responsible for cynicism or apathy among the electorate. Contrary to the wishes of many, Obama is not the massiah of liberalism. He is a Centrist, who learned the lessons taught by Clinton in the 1990's regarding radical social issues. He will be satisfied with a health care bill that passes, whether or not it contains a “public option,” and whether or not it provides universal coverage. He will claim victory and make the best argument he can for the practical need for compromise in order to achieve “progress,” no matter how imperfect.
And he will be right.
But it is one of the many curses of long life that I must remember that these shining moments are all too brief and that the shine is easily and quickly tarnished.
The reality is that the default position for the American electorate is stasis; i.e., resistance to real change. The nature of our politics is that elections are decided by a small percentage of voters - so-called swing voters because they have no ideological or party loyalty. Rather, they sway from left to right to middle, easily manipulated by events, rhetoric, rumor, always motivated by fear.
Obama’s brief shining moment, his Golden Age, may be one of the shortest ever. FDR’s lasted about four years (1933 through 1936); LBJ’s two years (1965 and 1966).
If the health care law turns out to be a disappointment, meaning that (1) it fails to provide universal coverage, (2) seems to be a boondoggle to the insurance companies, and (3) is perceived to be too costly for most people, and if unemployment continues to rise or seems to be stagnant, the midterm election of 2010 may bring an end to any possible alteration of the status quo.
I well remember the 1960's, an era which - to this current generation - stands mostly for excessive optimism and bad hair. The notion that spiritual enlightenment was achievable through individual or collective shortcuts such as drugs, meditation, rock and roll, or free love is rightly viewed as a ridiculous illusion.
But that is not the 60's that I best remember. Another side of the optimistic urge for change manifested in more rational but no less hopeful attempts at leaps of progress. The United States Supreme Court, an institution which for most of our history has been a powerful force against even incremental change, for the blink of an eye under Chief Justice Earl Warren, carried the struggle for societal progress, with revolutionary decisions that enforced racial equality, ensured the separation of church and state, and gave new meaning to the Bill of Rights, especially the often neglected minority protections, the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Amendments. It has taken the powers of reaction 40 years to unravel the framework the Warren Court constructed.
In the middle of the decade, political winds gathered to create a perfect storm of progress that had not been equaled since 1933. After the death of JFK, the Republicans nominated Barry Goldwater, the most ideological and polarizing candidate possible. LBJ won a strong mandate and used his unique position as a Southerner with a congressional expertise to pass the Civil Rights Act, the most important racial equality law passed since Reconstruction.
In 1965, LBJ pushed through the Congress the experiment in socialized medicine called Medicare. He followed this with the most optimistic set of programs since the New Deal: his War on Poverty, a constellation of programs designed to directly aid the poor. It included Head Start, the Job Corps, food stamps, and was credited with reducing the percent of families below the poverty line to the lowest it had ever been.
Of course, LBJ soon trashed all the possibilities for progress with his tragic Vietnam policy. Most of his programs were quickly dismantled with the rise of Milton Friedman, resulting in deregulation, reliance on so-called “free markets”, the decline of trade unionism, and “trickle down economics.”
Beginning in the disastrous year of 1968, the Democratic Party began a rapid decline. Progressivism (poisonously labeled “Liberal”) became a dirty word, rejected by the two successful presidential candidates, both right of center Southern governors, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Both tried to meld a few social policies that were mildly progressive with economic policies that co-opted moderate Republican positions. Both abetted the erosion of Constitutional freedoms, supporting laws that expanded the police power of the government. Carter began the rush to deregulation; Clinton raised campaign fundraising to an art, surpassed Republicans in pandering to corporate lobbyists with the resulting policies that declared “the era of big government was over” and abetting a free market boom that laid the groundwork for Bush’s subsequent rape of the middle class and the crash of our entire economy.
The election of 2008 at first presented a mirror image of the 1968 election. This time, it was the Republican candidate who was saddled with the legacy of disaster by his party’s president. The difference was that this Democrat presented a literal face of change in the most obvious sense. Yet, in a sense, this was an illusion. Oddly, Barack Obama resembles JFK in this way. His personal image wreaks of change, but his politics is actually less radical than his image.
Obama’s overwhelming victory, which dragged in Democratic majorities in both houses of congress, was another illusion. The apparent “mandate for change” neglected to consider the realities, particularly of Democratic party politics. Clinton democrats really control the Senate, with “Blue Dogs”, or heirs of the Democratic Leadership Council, whose politics are barely distinguishable from Republicans.
The lack of difference between the parties has been decried by many observers, cited as responsible for cynicism or apathy among the electorate. Contrary to the wishes of many, Obama is not the massiah of liberalism. He is a Centrist, who learned the lessons taught by Clinton in the 1990's regarding radical social issues. He will be satisfied with a health care bill that passes, whether or not it contains a “public option,” and whether or not it provides universal coverage. He will claim victory and make the best argument he can for the practical need for compromise in order to achieve “progress,” no matter how imperfect.
And he will be right.
Friday, June 19, 2009
The Midnight Sun
Once upon a time in the land of the midnight sun, a nearsighted woman was raped by two men. She identified a man as one of them and he was sentenced to prison. Now, with the aid of the Innocence Project, he wants his DNA compared with fluids donated by the rapist to prove his innocence, asserting his willingness to pay for the tests himself so the state will have no financial excuse.
Many states have fashioned procedures for such post conviction testing. Alaska is not one of them. Their high court denied his request in 2001. Now the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a 5-4 opinion upholding the denial. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority. He could find no provision in the Constitution that mentioned the right to a DNA test. As an example of the philosophy of judicial restraint, he suggested that this was an issue that state legislatures are better able to address. He was joined by Alito, Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy (the so-called swing vote).
Justice Stevens dissented, finding it outrageous that a man must serve a life sentence when there is a means of proving or disproving his guilt which is available, cheap, and certain. And, oh yeah, isn’t there a provision called the 14th Amendment which guarantees "due process"? He was joined by Ginsberg, Breyer and Souter, who filed as separate dissenting opinion - differing from the other dissenters in the issue of how broad a "right" should be.
The case presents a fairly clear example of what is at stake in the selection of Supreme Court justices. The trenches are deep and apparent: judicial restraint vs. judicial activism. The issue: is there a court of last resort when an injustice is ignored by legislatures and state courts?
To be clear, before trial, an accused has a recognized right to access of the evidence to test it. That right was recognized long ago by the same Supreme Court (in Brady v. Maryland). Also, during post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding, most states and federal courts authorize appointment of experts for DNA testing. State rules about these processes vary greatly - most impose nearly insurmountable obstacles to overturn convictions.
The fact is that the legal system is psychologically defensive about admitting its possible errors. The tradition and bias is to favor closure over certainty. Conservative jurists wax eloquently about the need for finality in the system. Public opinion generally concurs - how many times have you heard the media decry the "endless appeals" by prisoners alleging "technicalities" and using "legal tricks" to overturn convictions?
In the 90's, Congress passed legislation (with President Clinton’s support) limiting access to habeas corpus post-convictions appeals. We are now living with the effects of that misguided law. To date, more than 200 guilty verdicts have been proven by DNA evidence to have been wrong. Many of those innocent people had been condemned to death or life sentences.
Many states have fashioned procedures for such post conviction testing. Alaska is not one of them. Their high court denied his request in 2001. Now the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a 5-4 opinion upholding the denial. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority. He could find no provision in the Constitution that mentioned the right to a DNA test. As an example of the philosophy of judicial restraint, he suggested that this was an issue that state legislatures are better able to address. He was joined by Alito, Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy (the so-called swing vote).
Justice Stevens dissented, finding it outrageous that a man must serve a life sentence when there is a means of proving or disproving his guilt which is available, cheap, and certain. And, oh yeah, isn’t there a provision called the 14th Amendment which guarantees "due process"? He was joined by Ginsberg, Breyer and Souter, who filed as separate dissenting opinion - differing from the other dissenters in the issue of how broad a "right" should be.
The case presents a fairly clear example of what is at stake in the selection of Supreme Court justices. The trenches are deep and apparent: judicial restraint vs. judicial activism. The issue: is there a court of last resort when an injustice is ignored by legislatures and state courts?
To be clear, before trial, an accused has a recognized right to access of the evidence to test it. That right was recognized long ago by the same Supreme Court (in Brady v. Maryland). Also, during post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding, most states and federal courts authorize appointment of experts for DNA testing. State rules about these processes vary greatly - most impose nearly insurmountable obstacles to overturn convictions.
The fact is that the legal system is psychologically defensive about admitting its possible errors. The tradition and bias is to favor closure over certainty. Conservative jurists wax eloquently about the need for finality in the system. Public opinion generally concurs - how many times have you heard the media decry the "endless appeals" by prisoners alleging "technicalities" and using "legal tricks" to overturn convictions?
In the 90's, Congress passed legislation (with President Clinton’s support) limiting access to habeas corpus post-convictions appeals. We are now living with the effects of that misguided law. To date, more than 200 guilty verdicts have been proven by DNA evidence to have been wrong. Many of those innocent people had been condemned to death or life sentences.
Tuesday, June 09, 2009
Adventures of a Principled Centrist
Like many of my peers in the late 1960's, I entered a law career with a radicalized illusion that I could shake up The Establishment from within. But early in my career as a public defender, I became persuaded that idealists made lousy lawyers. Viewing a case as "a cause" led to ineffective advocacy for the individuals who were our clients. Railing against "the system" was a losing strategy; tweaking it to make it work led to some success. To work from within demanded adherence to core principles - like those expressed in the Bill of Rights, but also a rational sense of moderation. Seeing the flaws of radical ideologies of Left and Right, I came to think of myself as a principled centrist.
The flaw of this philosophy is that it can easily lead to indecision, timidity, and a loss of confidence. Weak compromises are tempting when the risks are great. Uncertainty leads to failure and depression.
Barack Obama, by education and inclination, is a principled centrist. His legal education, which suited his innate propensities, prepared him well for effective advocacy. The first attribute of the lawyerly approach is the ability to see all sides of a question. The second is the exercise of judgments based on reason and evidence rather than faith and ideology.
The term itself is an oxymoron in presidential politics. The centrist is wedded to no firm ideology that huge numbers of people can identify with. It is historically rare to satisfy enough of the people enough of the time from the middle of the road.
The centrist is not an ideologue, except to moderation. Idealogues have a rigid vision, a religious faith in their righteousness. Moderation and consensus are lukewarm ideals. Neither notion stirs passion.
Ronald Reagan’s simple ideology allowed him to be certain and clear about every issue: lower taxes, secure defense, less government, American domination of foreign affairs, strict Christian morality and adherence to normative lifestyles. A centrist cannot be sure about any of these things, is sometimes for some of them, against some at some other times. He is a relativist - his motto must be "It depends." His survival depends on compromise.
A principled centrist in American politics is, by definition, in trouble. First, he states his principles, then is forced to compromise them. Bill Clinton’s adventure with the health care issue in the 1990's is a cautionary tale. He stated a principle: universal coverage. Eventually, he had to temporize, and was seen as weak, the inevitable risk of centrists. The result: his leadership coinage dissipated. He could not fall back on the moral leverage of ideology, had no constant constituency on left or right.
Obama has advantages Clinton never had. Times have changed. In 1993, Clinton’s "mandate for change" was tenuous at best. G.H.W. Bush had alienated a chunk of the Reagan coalition - the middle right - with higher taxes and a weak economy. Because Clinton was a "new" Democrat, based on a sensible, more conservative model, who shied from liberal doctrine, he was positioned as non-threatening. On the left, he was pictured as youthful, a JFK disciple, compassionate, with a feminist wife - a guy of the sixties, who had matured to moderate progressivism. Many "boomers" could identify with that beause they had moved that way as well.
The two-faced picture was enough to gain him a slim plurality in a three way race. Perot's candidacy made it clear that the only consensus in the public mind was that government was distrusted, and that the majority of voters were slightly to the right of center. But that is where the consensus ended.
There was no singleness of mind in the public for where it wanted a president to go. There was no mandate for any particular change. Clinton thought it was there for health care reform, fooled by the fact that he spoke about it in his speeches and he was elected. But the public was never fully committed to it, and was easily swayed by fears of expense and bureaucratic incompetence. In this as in every other issue the people wanted reform, but didn’t want to pay for it: crime, the economy, services, campaign reform. The public was schizophrenic: apathetic and impatient at the same time.
When the Republicans reclaimed the Congress in 1994 with a severe ideological conservative agenda, it forced Clinton the centrist to waffle to the right. The lesson was clear: a centrist may only succeed as a progressive leader if the public is ready to be led and only then by a leader who is perceived as a hero without baggage.
The commentators of the time blamed Clinton for a lack of leadership. The great leader defines the issues and unifies the people behind him. That Clinton failed to do. What he was forced to do is what a centrist does best: react to the extremes of left and right. He must be the captain of a sailing ship, tacking left and right but steering the middle. Clinton’s political acumen was such that he was able to survive well enough to be re-elected and, despite his tragic personal flaws, his presidency is now remembered as a time of peace and prosperity.
Obama’s advantage is that the crises caused by the failure of G.W. Bush’s failure, which is ascribed rightly to the flaw of rigid ideological governance, have forced public opinion to coalesce into a coherent consensus for change - not necessarily "radical" change, but at least, meaningful reform.
The last time that happened was in 1964, when L.B.J. took advantage of his opponent’s extreme conservatism, to form a strong coalition for social change. He succeeded in passing meaningful civil rights reform and programs that began a "war on poverty", only to self-immolate over Viet-Nam.
F.D.R. is probably the better model for Obama. F.D.R. was (and still is) perceived as a decisive leader because his motto was "do anything, but do something". He was able to take chances because the public of the time was willing to be led - almost anywhere. The times were that bad. His one principle was that government had to put people back to work. Everything he proposed, supported, persuaded, was directed toward that goal. He had many detractors from the left and right, but he had such a convincing presence to a people desperate for charismatic leadership that he prevailed and is revered as a great leader. He formed his consensus from huge chunks of the public: union members (in a time of solidly unified, active and powerful unions), Southern poor, the unemployed (25% unemployment in the depths of the depression) and the educated un-rich.
The Obama constituency is similarly broad: the educated and hopeful young, aspiring Hispanics and proud African-Americans, depressed boomers. Like F.D.R., he benefits from a bankrupt and disillusioned opposition party.
The fatal flaw of ideological and faith based governance is that when exposed as false by incontrovertible evidence it collapses. The strength of principled centrism is that its flexibility and foundation of moderation and reliance on evidence permit fine-tuning alterations without conceding defeat.
In the view of many historians, FDR’s policies failed to end the Depression because they were not radical enough. His centrism was a flaw, led to inconsistent contradictory policies. He wavered from his initial policy of governmental activism, caving to budget balancing contraction of spending, overly fearful of the political consequences of huge deficits. He was saved by the war which reinvigorated the broad consensus and commitment to action.
Obama, the principled centrist, walks the dangerous tightrope, his only net is his legal background.
The flaw of this philosophy is that it can easily lead to indecision, timidity, and a loss of confidence. Weak compromises are tempting when the risks are great. Uncertainty leads to failure and depression.
Barack Obama, by education and inclination, is a principled centrist. His legal education, which suited his innate propensities, prepared him well for effective advocacy. The first attribute of the lawyerly approach is the ability to see all sides of a question. The second is the exercise of judgments based on reason and evidence rather than faith and ideology.
The term itself is an oxymoron in presidential politics. The centrist is wedded to no firm ideology that huge numbers of people can identify with. It is historically rare to satisfy enough of the people enough of the time from the middle of the road.
The centrist is not an ideologue, except to moderation. Idealogues have a rigid vision, a religious faith in their righteousness. Moderation and consensus are lukewarm ideals. Neither notion stirs passion.
Ronald Reagan’s simple ideology allowed him to be certain and clear about every issue: lower taxes, secure defense, less government, American domination of foreign affairs, strict Christian morality and adherence to normative lifestyles. A centrist cannot be sure about any of these things, is sometimes for some of them, against some at some other times. He is a relativist - his motto must be "It depends." His survival depends on compromise.
A principled centrist in American politics is, by definition, in trouble. First, he states his principles, then is forced to compromise them. Bill Clinton’s adventure with the health care issue in the 1990's is a cautionary tale. He stated a principle: universal coverage. Eventually, he had to temporize, and was seen as weak, the inevitable risk of centrists. The result: his leadership coinage dissipated. He could not fall back on the moral leverage of ideology, had no constant constituency on left or right.
Obama has advantages Clinton never had. Times have changed. In 1993, Clinton’s "mandate for change" was tenuous at best. G.H.W. Bush had alienated a chunk of the Reagan coalition - the middle right - with higher taxes and a weak economy. Because Clinton was a "new" Democrat, based on a sensible, more conservative model, who shied from liberal doctrine, he was positioned as non-threatening. On the left, he was pictured as youthful, a JFK disciple, compassionate, with a feminist wife - a guy of the sixties, who had matured to moderate progressivism. Many "boomers" could identify with that beause they had moved that way as well.
The two-faced picture was enough to gain him a slim plurality in a three way race. Perot's candidacy made it clear that the only consensus in the public mind was that government was distrusted, and that the majority of voters were slightly to the right of center. But that is where the consensus ended.
There was no singleness of mind in the public for where it wanted a president to go. There was no mandate for any particular change. Clinton thought it was there for health care reform, fooled by the fact that he spoke about it in his speeches and he was elected. But the public was never fully committed to it, and was easily swayed by fears of expense and bureaucratic incompetence. In this as in every other issue the people wanted reform, but didn’t want to pay for it: crime, the economy, services, campaign reform. The public was schizophrenic: apathetic and impatient at the same time.
When the Republicans reclaimed the Congress in 1994 with a severe ideological conservative agenda, it forced Clinton the centrist to waffle to the right. The lesson was clear: a centrist may only succeed as a progressive leader if the public is ready to be led and only then by a leader who is perceived as a hero without baggage.
The commentators of the time blamed Clinton for a lack of leadership. The great leader defines the issues and unifies the people behind him. That Clinton failed to do. What he was forced to do is what a centrist does best: react to the extremes of left and right. He must be the captain of a sailing ship, tacking left and right but steering the middle. Clinton’s political acumen was such that he was able to survive well enough to be re-elected and, despite his tragic personal flaws, his presidency is now remembered as a time of peace and prosperity.
Obama’s advantage is that the crises caused by the failure of G.W. Bush’s failure, which is ascribed rightly to the flaw of rigid ideological governance, have forced public opinion to coalesce into a coherent consensus for change - not necessarily "radical" change, but at least, meaningful reform.
The last time that happened was in 1964, when L.B.J. took advantage of his opponent’s extreme conservatism, to form a strong coalition for social change. He succeeded in passing meaningful civil rights reform and programs that began a "war on poverty", only to self-immolate over Viet-Nam.
F.D.R. is probably the better model for Obama. F.D.R. was (and still is) perceived as a decisive leader because his motto was "do anything, but do something". He was able to take chances because the public of the time was willing to be led - almost anywhere. The times were that bad. His one principle was that government had to put people back to work. Everything he proposed, supported, persuaded, was directed toward that goal. He had many detractors from the left and right, but he had such a convincing presence to a people desperate for charismatic leadership that he prevailed and is revered as a great leader. He formed his consensus from huge chunks of the public: union members (in a time of solidly unified, active and powerful unions), Southern poor, the unemployed (25% unemployment in the depths of the depression) and the educated un-rich.
The Obama constituency is similarly broad: the educated and hopeful young, aspiring Hispanics and proud African-Americans, depressed boomers. Like F.D.R., he benefits from a bankrupt and disillusioned opposition party.
The fatal flaw of ideological and faith based governance is that when exposed as false by incontrovertible evidence it collapses. The strength of principled centrism is that its flexibility and foundation of moderation and reliance on evidence permit fine-tuning alterations without conceding defeat.
In the view of many historians, FDR’s policies failed to end the Depression because they were not radical enough. His centrism was a flaw, led to inconsistent contradictory policies. He wavered from his initial policy of governmental activism, caving to budget balancing contraction of spending, overly fearful of the political consequences of huge deficits. He was saved by the war which reinvigorated the broad consensus and commitment to action.
Obama, the principled centrist, walks the dangerous tightrope, his only net is his legal background.
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